Abstract. In 2011, to manage the exceptional flow of refugees escaping North Africa, the Italian government released the North Africa Emergency Provisions, temporarily relaxing immigration policies for some categories of migrants. By using data from an important charity, we perform difference-in-differences estimations and investigate the impact of this emergency rule on the probability of migrants regularizing their legal status. Results show that the emergency provisions increased the number of successful applications in favor of entitled individuals; it also dramatically boosted the denial rate for other migrants.
Introduction
Immigration to Italy is a phenomenon that has become especially relevant over the last few decades (Bonifazi et al. 2009 , de Haas 2008 , Del Boca & Venturini 2005 , Zincone 2006 , Klepp 2010 . Recently, it has been greatly affected by an exceptional influx of citizens from North African countries, mostly generated by the 2011 civil war in Libya, as well as by political turmoil in Egypt and stemming from the Maghreb (the so-called Arab Spring).
All migrants in Italy face a number of specific legal and administrative issues. 4 In particular, in order to stay legally in the country, non-European Union (EU) migrants are required to hold a residence permit (permesso di soggiorno). Although this administrative document can be obtained from the public authorities (i.e., police) provided a migrant satisfies the required qualifications, anecdotal evidence suggests that many people experience difficulties in handling these operations. Typically, migrants can undertake by themselves to comply with migration rules, mainly by following Internet-based procedures (although an Internet connection is necessary). However, as both legal practitioners and the authors have found, such procedures are not easy to manage. In particular, there are many different applicable permits (see Figure A .1 in the Appendix). In some cases, payment is required, 5 and not all the necessary information is provided in a variety of languages. While the government does provide support tools-including help-desks in the city halls of the major towns-migrants typically try to fill institutional gaps by relying on informal networks (e.g., family and friends) or the help of charities.
In Milan, the second-largest city in Italy-which hosts vibrant communities of foreign citizens 6 -the Casa della Carità (hereafter, CdC) is a significant example of a charity that provides this kind of legal 4 The main legislative source for Italian migration regulation is the "Consolidated Act on Immigration Laws", D.lgs. No. 286/1998 (the so-called Turco-Napolitano law, amended in 2002 by the so-called Bossi-Fini law), which was enacted in 1998 but has been significantly updated through the inclusion of new and specific provisions. 5 For example, some residence permits-including those for family reasons and those for work purposes-involve payments ranging from EUR80 to EUR200 (plus EUR14.62 in electronic stamps). 6 According to the official statistics of the City of Milan, in 2012, foreign people represented 19% of the legally resident population;
at the national level, they represent 8.2% of the legally resident population. In addition, Milan-like other large cities-attracts many irregular migrants; in fact, estimations suggest that there is one irregular migrant for every 10 regular migrants (Dossier Caritas clearly protected by the ENA provisions-the situation for Sub-Saharan Africans was rather unclear until
October 30, 2012. 16 The surge of residence permits released in 2011 for asylum and humanitarian reasons to migrants from North Africa and the Horn (hereafter, NAH migrants) is indeed evident in Fig Further difficulties emerged in the handling of the crisis when it became clear that this temporary special protection regime had been exploited by nonentitled migrants. In particular, there is evidence that those who had not entered Italy in the relevant period (for example, people who had already been in the country irregularly) tried to take advantage of the emergency situation to acquire a permit to regularize their status. 17 More generally, cheating by nonentitled migrants regarding either their time of arrival in Italy or country of origin 18 could be identified as one of the factors responsible for the congestion of the entire 16 A large number of the asylum seekers who arrived in 2011 were citizens of other countries, but had lived and worked in Libya for many years. Although they were fleeing persecution that targeted them during the Libyan civil war, the Italian government initially chose not to extend any specific measure of general and/or temporary protection to these refugees. An official Document by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Documento di indirizzo per il superamento dell 'emergenza Nord Africa, October 30, 2012) lately recognized that this problem could lead to a "potentially explosive situation," as most of the applications for international protection made by the "Libyan escapees" had initially been rejected. Although this document did not automatically grant a status of humanitarian protection, it was clear from its contents that the government implicitly conceived a solution by inviting these refugees to demand a re-examination of their applications (cf. Associazione Giuridica per gli Studi sull'Immigrazione, http://www.asgi.it/home_asgi.php?n=2441&l=it). Notably, on October 30, 2012, the Ministry of the Interior instructed the territorial Commissions to consider the need for humanitarian protection with respect to the persistent situation of hardship in Libya when deciding a case for re-examination. However, this solution was considered a tardy measure, and potential applicants were not supported by a comprehensive set of information (cf. Casa della Carità, http://www.casadellacarita.org/emergenza-nord-africapermesso).
17 For example, according to the Decree of April 5, 2011, foreign citizens who had fled to Italy in the relevant period and had already obtained, requested, or been refused another type of residence permit could apply for temporary ENA protection. For this reason, it is possible that the special protection was requested and obtained also by migrants who were not entitled to it.
administrative system. (As will be discussed, the other relevant factor was errors in application procedures made by migrants, and/or misleading counseling.)
As a matter of fact, continuous amendments and the release of updated regulatory provisions regarding the African emergency were a clear expression of the serious difficulties faced by the Italian government in early 2011. The considerable institutional effort expended to provide effective ENA-based protection to refugees from North Africa has consequently resulted in the last few years in a very complicated picture of Italian migration policy. Such a situation, also driven by the fact that the consequences of the emergency were still unpredictable at that time, may also have affected the position of migrants who were interested in regularizing their legal status through "ordinary" (i.e., nonemergency) procedures.
On one hand, some migrants -especially those entitled to the ENA benefits -may have benefited from the (temporary) relaxation of the procedures to obtain a residence permit. On the other hand, other migrants-namely, those not benefiting from the ENA-might have suffered a sort of displacement on account of the enactment of the emergency rules.
Accordingly, the main goal of this study is to perform an empirical analysis, in order to investigate whether such a situation has actually occurred. Difference-in-differences (DID) estimations provide evidence that this temporary emergency rule indeed increased the rate of success in obtaining a residence permit among ENA-entitled migrants; conversely, we also found that applicants not entitled to such provisions suffered a dramatic surge in the application denial rate.
At least three non-mutually exclusive drivers of this displacement effect can be conjectured. First, the This work is organized as follows. The next section presents the dataset used in the analysis. Section 3 uses DID techniques to estimate the effects of the ENA provisions on various categories of treated groups of applicants for a residence permit; it also discusses the econometric results. Section 4 briefly discusses the potential drivers of the displacement effect that has been empirically identified; it also offers some preliminary policy implications and concluding remarks.
Data
The data used in this study are from the January 1, 2010-March 31, 2013 period, and were collected and coded by the authors using information gathered by personnel at CdC. During the period of observation, 466 people were provided with legal assistance. As most of the individuals who come into contact with CdC are not Italian citizens (cf. The data show that 54.97% of the cases included in the analysis have definitely been resolved (cf. TABLE 6 here Notably, the emergency regime seems to have impacted also non-African migrants, even though the relevant provisions did not apply to them. As Table 7 shows, there was a substantial decrease in the rate of application success among other migrants, following ENA enactment. 24 In this case, one could guess that with the massive influx of newly arrived migrants from Africa, the system somehow "seized up" thus deteriorating-and maybe sacrificing-the positions of the other migrants.
Obviously, the rate of success in obtaining a residence permit may depend on several factorsincluding, for instance, specific applicant features (e.g., labor skills, family conditions, and socioeconomic situation) and the quality and effort of legal advice provided by CdC. We account for all such features in the empirical analysis. 22 In 91.89% of the resolved cases, the result was favorable to the applicant (i.e., the permit was obtained or renewed).
23 Two different data specifications referring to the rate of success are provided: in the first (column b), only NAH migrants are included; in the second (column c), all African migrants are considered. These two different specifications reflect the alternative definitions of the treated groups used in the empirical analysis.
Empirical analysis
The ENA provisions of April 5, 2011 can be viewed as a natural experiment, since the decree automatically granted to NAH migrants who had fled to Italy in the relevant period (January 1 -April 5 , 2011) a temporary residence permit for humanitarian reasons.
To take advantage of this experimental opportunity, we run DID regressions to estimate the effects of the ENA provisions on the probability of obtaining (or renewing) a residence permit.
We estimate the following equation:
where obtainRP indicates whether a residence permit was accorded. The binary variable time takes the value 1 from the date in which the ENA provisions were enacted (April 5, 2011) onwards; entitled equals 1 when the migrant, being a citizen of a country in North Africa or the Horn of Africa, was entitled to benefit from the special treatment.
More specifically, to account for the fact that the ENA provisions were accorded to migrants from North African countries (and soon afterwards to people from the Horn), while the status of refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa was defined only later, we consider two possible definitions of the treatment dummy.
The first one includes only North African citizens and people from the Horn and neighboring countries, as mentioned in the Presidential Decree of August 3, 2011 (entitledNAH), while the second one includes all African citizens (entitledA) who fled to Italy in the January 1 to April 5, 2011 period.
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x i is a vector of covariates, including date of birth, gender, education, marital status, number of children, information on the family of origin, and regional and country-of-origin fixed effects. Dummies for the advisor and the office receiving applicants at CdC were also introduced. All summary statistics related to 25 As noted before, a large number of the asylum-seekers that fled to Italy in 2011 were citizens of other African countries who had lived and worked in Libya for many years. The status of these refugees remained undetermined for a long time, as it was only on October 30, 2012 that the government defined their situation: although the "Libyan escapees" were not explicitly granted humanitarian protection, they were "invited" to apply for a re-examination of their case.
the covariates, as well as a description of each variable, are reported in Table 8 . Finally, Φ(.) is a normal cumulative distribution function.
As for the parameters in Equation (1), α 0 and α 1 estimate the effect of the ENA provisions on the control group, before and after the treatment, respectively. Correspondingly, α 2 and α 3 measure the effect on ENA-entitled migrants, before and after the treatment, respectively. Finally, 4 α is a ( 1) vector of parameters associated with the covariates. Table 9 reports the Probit estimates of Equation (1) when the treated group contains only NAH migrants. Tables 11 and   12 , respectively.
In addition, in columns (a)-(e) of each table, we report the estimates obtained for five different specifications of Equation (1), which correspond to the progressive inclusion of regional and country fixed effects. For the first specification (column (a)), we omit all fixed effects. For the second specification (column (b)), we include regional dummies that do not correspond to regions subject to the ENA provisions and/or are not mentioned in the Presidential Decree of August 3, 2011; meanwhile, in column (c), all regional fixed effects are accounted for. Finally, in column (d), we introduce dummies for the country of origin, except those corresponding to nations subject to the aforementioned provisions. In column (e), all national fixed effects are included.
In general, the results show that the interaction term entitled*time-which is associated with the effect of the ENA provisions on the group of ENA-entitled applicants-is always positive and significant. There is instead no evidence that before April 5, 2011 the treated group of NAH migrants received more favorable treatment, since the parameters related to entitledNAH (Tables 9 and 11 ) and entitledA (Tables 10 and 12) are not significant.
The unexpected result is that, although the control group of migrants looks neither advantaged nor discriminated against compared to the treated group before the enactment of the ENA regime (the constant term is never significant), the probability of obtaining a residence permit dramatically decreased for this same group of migrants following the application of the ENA provisions (the parameter associated with time is always negative and significant). This confirms what was suggested in the descriptive statistics of the previous section.
Regarding the possibility of self-selection into the group of ENA-entitled migrants, we exclude the possibility that the ENA enactment may have itself caused changes in the definition of the treated group at the aggregate (i.e., national) level. In fact, as mentioned, the ENA rules have been designed in such a way that migrants could not take advantage of these provisions, once they had knowledge of their existence. It is not coincidence, indeed, that the enactment date was April 5, whereas the relevant time of arrival in Italy required for eligibility was January 1-April 5, 2011. As a consequence, the ENA enactment should not have, per se, generated an additional influx of migrants from countries subject to the emergency, who were wishing to exploit these special provisions. Moreover, it is worth noting that since the ENA residence permits have mostly been granted according to verifiable characteristics (i.e., nationality and time of arrival in Italy), the probability of success should not, in principle, depend upon the individual-level and unmeasurable traits of the migrant.
Still, however, some migrants could have applied for a residence permit for humanitarian reasons (mostly under the ENA) on the basis of individual-level perceptions regarding the possibility of success, perhaps driven by the euphoria generated by this exceptional situation-and otherwise, in the absence of the ENA provisions, they would have applied for ordinary permits. Personal traits might thus have altered the willingness to seek out legal advice at CdC, and therefore also the composition of the treated group in our sample compared to the universe of ENA-entitled migrants. To determine whether this might have occurred,
we compared the ratio of ENA-entitled migrants applying for humanitarian reasons to the overall number of applications for work, study, and international/humanitarian protection, both at the national level and in our sample. We refer to 2011, since this is the most recent year for which data are available. At the national level, we selected two representative ENA countries, Tunisia and Morocco, which were among the first 10 countries in terms of entry to Italy (the remaining eight countries were not subject to the emergency).
National data show that 39.79% of the entries from Tunisia and Morocco related to applications for refugee status and humanitarian protection. In our data, 42% of the ENA-entitled migrants applied for such permit types. Hence, anecdotal evidence suggests that individual attitudes are not likely to have influenced the composition of the treated group in our sample, compared to a hypothetical treated group defined within the universe of Italian migrants.
Finally, there is additional noteworthy evidence suggested by our estimates. In particular, parameters associated with the covariates show that being younger, illiterate, and having family in Italy or Europe (compared to having the family in the home country) increases the probability of being accorded a permit. 
Discussion and conclusions
In this study, we used an original dataset containing micro-level data that were collected at CdC, an important charity in Milan, to estimate the effects of the North Africa Emergency rules (ENA). The ENA regime was implemented in 2011 by the Italian government to manage the exceptional flow of migrants escaping African crises, and we wished to assess how its enactment affected the probability of migrants being accorded a residence permit.
The results indicate that for the treated group there was a significant increase in the probability of obtaining a residence permit following the enactment of the ENA rules. This finding was somehow expected, and it supports the idea that the Italian government was somehow effective in recognizing a special status of protection for people who have escaped African countries under a state of emergency in 2011. However, we also noted that the ENA provisions adversely affected the condition of migrants in the control group, as their probability of being accorded a residence permit dramatically decreased following the ENA enactment.
Although the data do not allow for further investigation of the potential reasons for this unexpected displacement effect, at least three non-mutually exclusive drivers can be conjectured: (i) erroneous shifting from ordinary applications to ENA applications, (ii) system congestion, and (iii) rationing against ordinary applicants.
(i) The first possible explanation for the displacement effect may be identified as an unwanted shifting from ordinary procedures to the ENA procedure: some noneligible migrants might unsuccessfully have tried to apply for the ENA regime or for any another form of international or humanitarian protection. This could be due either to an attempt to strategically exploit the relaxation of rules implied by the emergency provisions, or to a misinterpretation of the nature of the ENA. 27 From this viewpoint, possible policy implications would be to provide better information through public authorities, and to cultivate a more prudential attitude among legal advisors in terms of orienting applicants.
(ii) Another possible explanation for the observed displacement effect may simply relate to the difficulties associated with handling the crisis: the massive influx of newly arrived migrants from Africa might have somehow "jammed" the entire administrative system, thus deteriorating the position of nonAfrican migrants. Arguably, this congestion may be-at least in part-due to the aforementioned shifting effect from ordinary procedures to the ENA regime. Therefore, the ENA rules might have had an adverse effect on the functioning of the already-overloaded authorities who evaluate migrant applications. The congestion hypothesis seems to be consistent with several ex post considerations made by the Italian government vis-à-vis the ENA regime. 28 Thus, further research should feature a more in-depth examination of the distinction between applicants for "ordinary" residence permits (for working, studying, and family reasons) and permits that provide international or humanitarian protection. In this sense, it should be expected that this peculiar adverse effect had a greater impact on the latter category of applicants, at the expense of other migrants who required other types of residence permits.
(iii) Finally, a third driver of displacement may have been the implementation of a (more or less) tacit policy by public authorities, which may have aimed to ration-or, at least, restrain-the number of residence permits accorded each year. Although the Italian government does not explicitly make use of quotas with regard to requests for international or humanitarian protection, there is the possibility that the increase in the number of residence permits accorded to African migrants-due to the ENA enactment and subsequent measures-was counterbalanced by a stricter attitude toward other migrants. Further research is required, to shed light on these possible explanations. Issues not related to immigration 144 
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(2) For each of these variables, statistics are calculated on the basis of available entries (which do not total to 362, because of missing values). 
